




CONTINGENT PAY AND UNIONS: 
NEW EVIDENCE FROM ITALY 
 
Mirella DAMIANI — Andrea RICCI 
 
Quaderno n. 97  —  Novembre 2011 
QUADERNI DEL DIPARTIMENTO 
DI ECONOMIA, FINANZA 
E STATISTICA  
ISSN 1825-0211 1 
 
Decentralised bargaining and performance related pay: 










Purpose:  This  paper  examines  two  institutional  aspects  closely  related:  (i)  the  extent  to  which 
collective bargaining has been decentralized at firm or district level; (ii) the extent to which, at this 
level of bargaining, Performance Related Pay (PRP) have been used.   
Design/methodology/approach: On the basis of a unique database, which contains recent information 
on nationwide sample of firms, panel estimates aimed  at identifying the main factors which have 
favoured the adoption of the second level of bargaining and PRP are presented. 
Findings. unions, after size, is the main factor associated to the probability of the second 
level of bargaining and PRP. Significant estimates are also found for training. 
Research limitations/implications – Further research based on additional data  should enable us to 
identify causal effects.  
Practical implications: It offers new evidence to evaluate ongoing reform proposals to implement  
firm-level agreements more  tailored  to firms’ specific needs. 
Originality/value  our estimates are based on a unique dataset which contains  recent information and 
a nationwide sample of firms, representative of the whole Italian economy (other studies on Italy are 
more limited  in scope, since they focus  on specific sectors or regions). Second, it addresses the 









JEL Classification: J33; J51 





*Mirella  Damiani,  Professor  of  Economics,  Department  of  Economics,  Finance  and  Statistics,  University  of 
Perugia, Via Pascoli 20, 06123 Perugia, Italy, email: mirella.damiani@gmail.com. 
 
**Andrea  Ricci,  Researcher,  Area  di  Analisi  e  Valutazione  delle  Politiche  per  l’Occupazione,  ISFOL,  Roma, 
Corso d’Italia n. 33, 00161 Rome, Italy, email: andr.ricci@gmail.com. . The contents of the paper are responsibility of 









In  many  EU  member  states  some  steps  in  the  direction  of  replacing  centralized  bargaining  by  local 
bargaining have been moved in recent years. One of the aims of this process has been that of flexibilising 
wage systems and connecting rewards more closely to the requirements of individual enterprises. (European 
Commission, 2011, p. 131) Indeed, too rigid  wage setting and  working conditions cause  low workforce 
motivation and productivity and low cost competitiveness for firms involved in global competition. 
In Italy, however, this process has had limited implementation and up to now wage-setting takes place 
mainly trough industry-wide bargaining at national level. Indeed, one the mandates of the ECB includes 
among measures as ‘essentials’ to solve the deep Italian crisis, “the need to further reform the collective 
bargaining system allowing firm-level agreements to tailor wages and working conditions to firms’ specific 
needs and increasing their relevance with respect to other layers of negotiation.” (Trichet and Draghi, 2011) 
As  well  known,  for  Italy,  evidence  on  the  coverage  of  decentralised  agreements  and  diffusion  of 
performance related pay (PRP) is limited and dated. This offers the motivation of our paper. We examine 
decentralized  bargaining  and  diffusion  of  contingent  pays  on  the  basis  of  a  unique  dataset  obtained  by 
merging information from two different sources: firm-level information on workplace practices provided by 
ISFOL,  the Italian Institute for the Development of Vocational Training for Workers, and balance-sheet data 
from  the  Bureau  Van  Dijk  AIDA  archive.  On  the  basis  of  this  merged  dataset,  containing  a  wealth  of 
information on national scale on firm and employee characteristics, we perform panel estimates aimed at 
identifying the main factors which have hindered or favoured decentralised agreements and PRP. It seems a 
crucial issue  in a phase in  which the Italian system  of  industrial relations is under pressure and reform 
proposals have been advanced, in 2009 and 2011, in order to enlarge the diffusion of local arrangements, at 
company or district level
2.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature and briefly describes the Italian 
institutional setting. Section 3 presents the data that has been used, descriptive statistics, estimation strategy 
and results for the whole economy. Section 4 performs the econometric analysis by distinguishing industrial 
and service sector. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Background discussion 
 
2.1 Motivation 
This paper is aimed at studying the main factors behind the adoption of Second Level Bargaining (SLB) 
and Performance Related Pay (PRP) schemes in a country, such as Italy, which began to reveal, from the mid 
Nineties,  sizeable  slowing  in  labour  productivity  growth,  on  a  scale  without  equal  in  other  European 
                                                             
1This paper was presented at the AIEL, XXVI National Conference Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano, 15-16 
September 2011. We are grateful to the discussant Leonello Tronti and other participants to the conference for their 
useful comments. All errors remain ours. 
2The 22 January 2009 agreement was signed by the government, national employers' associations and the trade unions, 
with the exception of CGIL (one of three main national representative organizations of employees). The agreement 
designs new rules for wage setting in order to amplify the importance of the variable component. A second agreement, 
which moves in this direction, has been approved by the main trade unions and the industrial business associations on 
June 28 2011 and further measures to implement enterprise level negotiations are currently a matter of political debate. 
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economies.  The  potentials  and  limitations  of  its  bargaining  and  incentive  system  may  contribute  to 
explaining these disappointing performances, thus making Italy an interesting case study.  
Our estimates concern both SLB and PRP. The reason behind our choice is that even if in principle all 
firms can potentially introduce PRP schemes, in Italy they are usually bargained with local unions and they 
are part of a local (usually firm-level) agreement. The probability of introducing a PRP scheme is then highly 
correlated  with  the  probability  of  adopting  a  firm-level  agreement.  In  light  of  these  considerations,  we 
compare estimates for the determinants of SLB and PRP in order to verify if the probability of contingent 
pay is explained by the same forces behind adoption of the decentralized bargaining. 
We  analyse  the  role  of  firm  characteristics  (size,  sectoral  specialisation,  geographical  location,  past 
performances,  innovation  and  training  strategies)  but  particular  concern  is  devoted  to  the  influence  of 
training and innovation. The question is whether the diffusion of decentralisation of pay setting is motivated 
by strategical requirements of individual companies to improve the skills of their workforce and enhance 
(product and process) innovation.  
Recent analyses  of innovation call for  increasing  interest  on the relation between  firm propensity to 
innovation and work practices (Michie and Sheehan, 1999, 2003; Laursen and Foss 2003; Vinding 2004). 
This new literature points out that innovation is positively associated with participative labour relations and 
workers motivation, as tested recently for a region of the Italian economy (Gritti and Leoni, 2011)
3. For the 
latter case, the authors estimate that the combination of work practices that is most conducive to innovation 
consists in  industrial relations of ‘participatory’ type (p. 22) and, among others, individual  or collective 
bonuses linked to enterprise performance.  
In our case we will extend the analysis to the whole Italian economy and verify the association between 
adoption of compensation packages linked to firm performance and training. We expect that the need of 
tailoring working condition to the firm specific needs (thorough the second level of bargaining) may be more 
relevant when the fraction of trained employees is higher; in addition, workers representation may influence 
this expected association, since their attitude to improve working conditions and job security may strengthen 
beneficial effects of training, thus amplifying the expected link between training and diffusion of firm-level 
agreements.  
The contribution of this paper is thus to verify for the first time, at least for the Italian economy, this 
potential positive  effect. Only in a related recent study for the German case (Kriechel  et al. 2011), but 
focussed on explaining training intensity rather than bargaining intensity, it has been confirmed the positive 
influence  of  works  councils  and  in  any  case  no  estimates,  as  said  above,  are  available  for  the  Italian 
economy.  
A second, related issue, concerns the role of union strategies, to identify how much their attitudes may 
contribute in explaining the (limited) diffusion of local agreements and contingent pays. As known, the role 
of unions on the probability of adoption of PRP is controversial. Some studies found that in unionised plants, 
incentive payments, accompanied by joint decision-making, may be more likely present, leading to better 
results in terms of firm performances (Black and Lynch,  2001). Also, there is new evidence that even in low 
unionised economies, such as the UK, worker representations are perceived by employers as institutions 
capable of improving firm performance, as found by Bryson and Forth for the UK (2009). Other studies 
argue,  however,  that  employees’  representatives  may  inhibit  variable  payments,  which  in  principle  may 
                                                             
3 The analysis of Gritti and Leoni (2011) is based on a database of a sample of 166 manufacturing firms located in the 
Lombardy region (Italy). 4 
 
reduce wage compression, since one aim of unions’ strategy is limiting pay heterogeneities and easing wage 
compression (Addison and Hirsch, 1989).  
In addition, we are interested to test the role of a joint effect unions-training on encouraging decentralised 
bargaining and PRP. So far, existing literature has considered the association between unions and training 
and some direct and un-direct links have been advocated: through the wage structure or labour turnover (the 
indirect link) or through the negotiation of training (the direct link), with unclear final results. Some of the 
arguments concerning the un-direct link are the followings. The ability of firms to finance training may be 
limited when union power leads to excessive wage demands; furthermore, wage compression or premiums 
that compensate seniority rather than merits, more frequent in unionised companies, may reduce the same 
incentives of employees to improve their skills (Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1981, Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999) 
On the other hand, in unionized firms, constructive institutional responses overcome free rider problems of 
group incentives, increase workers’ commitments and reduce voluntary labour turnover (Booth and Chatterji, 
1998),  all  these  channels  may  explain  why  under  the  presence  of  unions,  which  guarantees  higher 
commitment and low labour turnovers, managers find convenient to offer higher levels of training to their 
employees.  
In addition, a direct link is represented by collective bargaining over training, more likely in unionised 
firms. In condition of uncertainty, workers tend to invest in firm-specific skills only when the employment 
relationship  is  expected  to  last,  otherwise  they  invest  in  portable  skills  (Wasmer,  2006);  in  such 
environments protection offered by unions may count.  
In our empirical analysis we attempt to address these issues by testing whether firms who have invested in 
training and in the productivity of the ‘match’ with their employees will be more oriented to share the returns 
of these investments, thus showing higher propensity to adopt compensation packages linked to company 
performance. 
 
2.2. The Italian institutional setting and previous empirical evidence  
Italy is characterized by a two-tier bargaining regime, designed by the July 1993 Agreement. In this new 
institutional  setting,  national  contracts  at  sectoral  level,  linked  to  the  target  inflation  rate,  should  have 
guaranteed the purchasing power of wages, whereas the decentralised bargaining should have distributed 
wage premiums, linked to productivity or company results. In addition, decentralised bargaining (at firm or 
district level) also had to deal with a number of additional issues such as working time, training, labour 
organisation,  union  relations.  This  institutional  setting  should  have  provided  enough  space  to  wage 
compensation  schemes  linked  to  efficiency  gains,  thus  promoting  reorganisation  and  innovation  of 
productive processes.  
However, implementation of decentralised bargaining has been  modest and it is  widely  held that the 
original aims of the 1993 Agreement have been accomplished only on a limited scale (Tronti, 2010). The 
reform of this setting, partially modified by the 22 January 2009 and the June 28 2011 agreements
4, are still 
object of current debates and new rules aimed at amplifying the importance of the decentralised level of 
negotiations and variable remuneration schemes are called for. The present paper, which refers to years 
                                                             
4The  2009  agreement  (Accordo  Quadro  Riforma  degli  Assetti  Contrattuali,  22  January  2009)  was  signed  by  the 
government, national employers' associations and the trade unions, with the exception of CGIL (one of three main 
national representative organizations of employees). One of the main points of disagreement concerns the possibility for 
enterprise negotiations  to define procedures and conditions for modifying, entirely or partly, also temporarily, specific 
elements (economic and normative) of sectoral collective agreements on wages. In this way it becomes possible to set 
up levels of remuneration below those determined by national wage bargaining agreements.  5 
 
preceding the mentioned recent changes, offers a contribution to the current debate and gives a detailed 
portrait  of  company  level  experiences  reached  in  2005  and  2007,  more  than  ten  years  after  the  1993 
Agreement.  It  also  contributes  at  identifying  the  main  firms’  and  workers’  characteristics  which  have 
favoured or contrasted the adoption of incentive company bonuses.  
A  number  of  official  studies  have  tried  to  explore  the  application  of  the  bargaining  rules  for  the 
decentralised level of negotiations introduced in Italy with the 1993 Agreement. The first official national 
survey on employee financial participation, undertaken in 1997 by the Italian Statistical Institute (ISTAT), 
showed the limited diffusion of firm-level agreements, which in 1995-96 involved only 9.9% of companies 
with at least 10 employees and 38.8% of total employment. In addition, a vast majority of the total amount of 
workers  involved  in  company  arrangements,  73.4%,  were  employed  in  the  industrial  sector,  while  the 
majority  of  firms  adopting  new  practices  were  located  in  the  North.  Concerning  the  wage  components, 
ISTAT estimated that the number of workers involved in financial participation in company results in 1995-
96 was around 23% of the total population of Italian workers, while the other most important pay scheme, 
the individual production bonus, was paid to only 12.5% of employees. ISTAT did not replicate its survey 
undertaken in 1999, which remained a una - tantum inquiry.  
Other sparse and fragmented information was made available from other sources for the last decade. The 
Bank of Italy, even if did not perform any specific investigations, integrated its Invid questionnaire (created 
to explore different issues), with some questions on the incidence of decentralised agreements and bonuses 
linked to enterprise performance. According to this source, there is evidence for declining importance over 
time of local bargaining: since 2000 the share of employees covered by second-level agreements fell from 
36% to 22% in companies with 20-49 workers and from 77% to 68% in firms with 50 or more workers 
(Bank of Italy Annual Report on 2008). This database makes evident also another weakness, namely the 
marginal importance of PRP, as it represented only 4% of the total compensation package (Casadio, 2008, 
2010).  
Falling trends, over a period of nine years from 1998 to 2006, are reported by the archive company 
contracts  available  from  the  CNEL  (the  National  Economic  and  Labour  Council),  and  relative  to  a 
representative sample of over 1,000 companies employing more than 100 workers. In addition, the annual 
surveys carried out by the Federmeccanica, the Italian Federation of Metalworking Employers, show even 
for a leader in terms of participatory practices a meaningful change in PRP: in periods of complementary 
agreements renewals, the incidence of bargaining among large companies fell from 51% in 2000 to 37% in 
2004, while among the smaller from 50% to 22%. 
Lastly, a comparative perspective is made available by two international surveys which confirm these 
declining  trends:  the  CRANET  (an  e-survey  on  a  sample  selected  randomly  from  the  population  of 
companies with at least 200 employees), and the European Working Conditions Survey-EWCS (a household 
survey conducted for 29 countries, EU-27 plus Croatia and Turkey, covering nearly 30,000 workers). Both 
sources document for many EU countries increasing average values of percentages of employees and firms 
involved in PRP schemes, such as profit sharing, but with some exceptions: Italy is one of them. 
However, the evidence described so far has been mainly limited in terms of their coverage by company 
size or sector. It may be enriched by the ISFOL surveys, as seen below. 
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
3.1 Data  6 
 
Our  empirical  study  is  based  on  a  nationally  representative  sample  of  manufacturing  and  non 
manufacturing firms, obtained by merging information from two different sources: balance-sheet data from 
the  Bureau  Van  Dijk  AIDA  archive  and  firm-level  information  on  performance-related  pay  and  other 
workplace practices from the ISFOL Employer and Employee Surveys (RIL). 
The ISFOL-RIL surveys are firm surveys which collected cross-sectional information relative to 2005 and 
2007  about  personnel  organization,  recruitment  strategies,  position  of  employees,  training  investments, 
presence of unions, adoption of PRP schemes and other workplace characteristics. It refers to firms operating 
in the non-agricultural private sector, and includes both partnership and limited companies. 
For what regards our key variables both SLB and PRP variable are dummy variables simply indicating 
the existence or not of a second level of bargaining and in this case, the presence of a PRP scheme of some 
kind
5. As far as unions are concerned, the respondent firm is asked whether there is a form of employee 
representation of any kind in the firm
6. We thus have a second dummy variable indicating the presence of 
unions at firm level. Furthermore, we have information about the workplace characteristics and business 
strategies of each firm (for a detailed definition of the variables see the Appendix). 
In order to link information concerning workers’ characteristics to indicators of firm performance and 
accounting variables, a sub-sample of the RIL dataset was merged using company tax codes with balance-
sheet information from the AIDA archive relative to the period 2005-2007. As the AIDA database contains 
the annual accounts for limited companies which had turnovers of over 100,000 Euros in 2004, the merged 
RIL-AIDA sample is representative only in the case of limited companies. Also, we exclude firms with less 
than ten employees, applying a filter to retain only those characterized by a minimum level of organisational 
structure. 
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics  
In this section we perform a descriptive analysis of the RIL-AIDA merged sample for the year 2005 and 
2007. To begin with, Table 1 reports the incidence of second level of bargaining (SLB) and PRP. The results 
show that the spread of SLB is modest, on average in 17% and 14% of firms in 2005 and 2007, respectively. 
Moreover, in 2005 and 2007, only 11% and 10% of firms have PRP schemes, thus confirming the limited 
spread of PRP agreements; indeed, even in firms with SLB, these schemes are not common practice and 
involve only a fraction of this population (59% and 67%, respectively). Unions, captured by the presence of 
the two distinct workers’ representation channels, are present, on average, in one fourth of firms of our 
sample. 
                                                             
5Each sampled firms in RIL survey is asked whether or not a firm level contract is adopted. In case of positive answer 
each is then asked to indicate whether the firm level contract consists of the adoption of PRP or, alternatively, other not 
better specified aspects of the second level bargaining. Unfortunately, we do not know whether the different types of 
schemes are based on firm-, group- or individual- performance. Besides, the dataset does not provide statistics on how 
many workers in the firm receive PRP or whether these schemes are offered to all or to a selected group of employees 
(managers, blue- collars, or all workers). 
6 In Italy, two distinct channels are present; the plant-level union representation structure- Rappresentanza Sindacale 
aziendale, RSA- and the unitary workplace union structure (Rappresentanza sindacale unitaria, RSU. In details, the 
Italian Workplace representation profile may be sketched out as follows. “The Workers’ Statute of 1970 gives the 
workers the right to organise a plant-level union representation structure (Rappresentanza sindacale aziendale, RSA). 
The tripartite agreement of July 1993 introduced – in addition to the RSA – a so called unitary workplace union 
structure (Rappresentanza sindacale unitaria, RSU). This body is elected  by all employees,  but representatives are 
usually  elected  through  trade  union  lists. Therefore,  it includes  features  of  both  works  councils  (the  broad  active 
electorate) and trade union bodies (the almost exclusive inclusion of trade union representatives). In general, it can be 
associated with trade union bodies” (EIRO, 2009). 7 
 
As for the  other characteristics of our sample, Table 1 shows that  more than  one  half  of companies 
implement innovation projects, the share of trained workers is around 40% while the share of workers with 
fixed- term contracts represents 10% of total employment for both  2005 and 2007. 
 
[INSERT Table 1] 
 
As known, PRP schemes are bargained with local unions and they are part of a local (usually firm-level) 
agreement, hence a main divide exists between companies with or without SLB, which is a precondition for 
PRP. However, we are also interested to verify if a divide also exists inside the group of firms with SLB,  but 
with or without PRP. The next step is then to compare three distinct groups of firms: i) companies without a 
firm-level contract; ii) with a firm level contract but without PRP; iii) with firm-level contract and with PRP. 
Table 2 presents a summary description of these three groups and allows verifying their different profiles 
(size, union, sectors, personnel characteristics) as well as the log of value added per employee, i.e. a proxy of 
firms’ performances. 
 
[INSERT Table 2] 
 
Table 2 and 3 make immediately evident that the characteristics of firms which adopt SLB (and within 
this group, the characteristics of those firm with PRP) are clearly different from the characteristics prevailing 
in firms without SLB.  In particular, what typifies the typical portrait of SLB firms is that they made more 
use of trained employees and are characterized by higher incidence of union presence with respect to NO 
SLB firms.  
They are also  more successful in terms of added  value levels,  more active  on grounds  of  outlays in 
innovation projects, greater involved, as said above, in offering training opportunities, but not exempt from 
paying PRP to the more protected (male and unionised) workforce component and make less use of fixed-
term contracts with respect to firms without SLB (in 2005 8% versus 11% and, in 2007, 6% versus 10%). 
Lastly, the female component appears to be more ‘segmented’ in SLB firms or in SLB firms without PRP 
contracts. 
Concerning  workforce  composition  in  terms  of  job  qualifications  and  tasks  performed,  there  are  not 
striking differences since the incidence of managerial, supervisory, white-collar and blue-collar workers is 
similar in all groups of firms. 
ISFOL data also confirm the existence of ample differentials by region, sector and firm size. A crucial 
aspect is the higher diffusion of PRP contracts, adopted by larger companies, located in Northern Italian 
regions and operating in the industrial sector (manufacturing, mechanics, textile), whereas PRP agreements 
are  less  present  in  services.  These  disparities,  already  shown  by  the  survey  carried  out  by  the  national 
statistics office for the mid-1990s (ISTAT, 1999), are still persistent and reveal heterogeneity in company 
strategies  and  in  their  utilisation  of  wage  flexibility.  It  is  remarkable  an  unequal  sectoral  distribution, 
ranging,  for  instance  in  2005,  from  28%  of  PRP  firms  in  manufacturing  to  2%  in  Transport  and 
communication. 
Last, notice a substantial inertia in firm strategies comparing 2005 and 2007, probably because of the 
short time period under study. 
 
[INSERT Table 3] 8 
 
 
The different profile of PRP firms, with respect to that of other two groups, is a stimulus to ascertain the 
actual motivations behind the adoption of company wage variable agreements. 
 
 
4. Econometric analysis 
 
4.1. The model  
The empirical analysis of probability of SLB and PRP is performed by using the unobserved effect probit 
model. Then we estimate the following equation: 
 
(1)        ( ) ( ) i it i it it X X y a b a + F = = , | 1 Pr         with t=2005,2007 
 
where  it y  is the dependent variable indicating whether firm adopt firm level bargaining or PRP, F is cdf 
of  the  normal  distribution,  Xit    contains  the  workplace  characteristics  supposed  to  affect  the  dependent 
variable and  i a  is the time invariant unobserved effect. 
In particular we use a conditional maximum likelihood approach to estimate a pooled probit model of 
equation  (1)  by  imposing  a a = i   and  a  random  effect  probit  model  by  assuming  i a   and    Xit    are 
independent and that  a a = i  is normally distributed:  ) , 0 ( | a s a N X it i »  . 
Actually applying fixed effect estimations is not a suitable empirical strategy in our case. This is because 
fixed effect binary outcomes model in short panel usually leads to inconsistent estimation for the parameters 
b  and  a s  (Wooldridge, 2001). Further we expect that fixed effect estimates are poorly efficient, since key 
variables in our sample show, over the period 2005-2007, little within variation as compared to between 
variation. 
In this context we use estimates separately the probability of adoption firm level bargaining and PRP by 
using  substantially  the  same  explanatory  variables.  The  aim  is  to  verifying  how  the  similar  workplace 
characteristics and firm performance affect differently the propensity to decentralized bargaining between 
firms and workers and, within a decentralized scheme, to adopt PRP. 
Further, as main focus is to analyze how the presence of union “filters” the impact of training on the 
probability to adopt firm level bargaining and PRP, we estimate the following specification of equation(1): 
 (1’)  
 
( ) ( ) i it it it it it i it it X union train train union X y a d b b b a + + + + F = = * , | 1 Pr 3 2 1  
 
where unionit is a dummy variable which indicates the presence of union at firm level, trainit is the share 
of trained workers and the vector Xit represents other workplace characteristics that may affect SLB and PRP 
(for details see Appendix).  
 
 4.1 Results 
The main findings of the econometric analysis are shown in Tables 4 and 5, where the estimates of the 
marginal effects are reported both for pooled probit and random effect probit models. In general, comparing 
Table 4 and 5 we note that many of the variables which are significantly associated with firms’ choice of 9 
 
adopting SLB also increases the probability of PRP agreements. Some factors deserve particular attention: 
industrial relations and  human capital practices, workforce features and firms characteristics in terms of 
sector of activity and geographical location. 
 
[INSERT Table 4] 
[INSERT Table 5] 
 
Labour relations and workplace practices   
One  of  the  most  robust  results  of  our  estimates  concern  industrial  relations.  In  particular  estimating 
equation  (1’)  without  interactive  terms  we  find  that  the  presence  of  union  at  the  establishment  level  is 
associated to a higher probability of signing  local agreements  of  more than 30%, both with pooled and 
random probit  estimates  (see  column a and c of Table 4). The union  variable retains also a significant 
positive impact on PRP, even if of smaller magnitude: according to both pooled and random probit estimates, 
the  probability  of  adoption  of  PRP  is  higher,  more  than  10%,  in  establishments  where  workers 
representatives are present (see column a and c of Table 5).   
Similarly, the training intensity generates higher probability to adopt SLB, being the marginal effects 
associated to the share of trained workers equal to 0.10 and 0.09 for pooled and random probit estimates, 
respectively (see columns a and c of Table 4). The marginal effect of trained workers on PRP is also positive 
and statistically significant; in this case pooled and random probit estimates are equal to 0.06 and 0.03, 
respectively (see columns a and c of Table 5).   
With additional specifications, we test the presence of a joint effect ‘unions and training’. Both pooled 
and random effect estimates show that unions’ attitude to sign local agreements and PRP is higher under 
training, more significantly in case of PRP estimates. For PRP estimates, training loses its significance as 
single determinant, but the interaction term (unions and training) passes the 5% level of significance (see 
columns b and d of Tables 4 and 5).  
Of course, some of the above results are expected. For example, it is well known, given the characteristics 
of the Italian institutional settings, that firm level bargaining are mainly negotiated with unions. However, 
the literature on employee financial participation (Pérotin and Robinson, 2003) widely discusses the negative 
trade union attitudes to the various forms of PRP, but this evidence does not find support in our case.  
In  addition,  as  mentioned  above,  economic  theory  has  traditionally  shown  that  training  provided  at 
company level encourages workers and firms to bargain over the expected returns of firm specific skills 
accumulation  (Hashimoto,  1982).  What  it  is  more  interesting  is  how  the  presence  of  union  ‘filters’  the 
training investment in affecting firm level bargaining. The rational behind this result is that risk bearing, 
implicit in the employment relationship characterized by firm-specific skills accumulation, is less beyond 
workers’ control under union governance, which may play a positive role in insulating employees from the 
risk of non portable skills. Indeed, the specificity of their investments makes workers’ outside options quite 
low in case of displacement, as argued by Wasmer (2006), but bargaining over training, in unionized firms, 
may assure some form of employment protection. 
In addition, one potential role of workers’ representatives is helping employees to protect the quasi-rents 
they have obtained by job-related training and human capital investments. Indeed, ample divergences may be 
found in beneficial effects of training since, in some cases, the magnitude of wage gains is only half as that 
on productivity, as shown by Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen (2005). Thus enterprise wage agreements may 
lower the divergences between the overall gains of workplace training. 10 
 
 
Workforce characteristics  
The other control variables for workers’ characteristics are the same used for descriptive statistics and are 
standard  in  the  related  literature  (see  for  example,  Gürtzgen,  2009).  Estimations  control  for  worker 
heterogeneity, such as gender and membership three occupational groups (managers and supervisors, white- 
and blue-collars). We also control whether an individual is employed on a fixed term contract and is trained. 
The  hypothesis  is  that  the  heterogeneity  of  workers  (differentiated  by  gender,  tenure  and  skills)  will 
influence the relationships we are testing.  
We obtain that neither blue-collars, nor white-collars have eligible conditions in terms of decentralised 
and  PRP  contracts;  this  finding  contrasts  with  other  countries’  experiences,  where  employees’  financial 
participation is more probable for blue-collar jobs, as in Germany (Heywood and Jirjahn 2002), or for white-
collars, as found in the UK (Robinson and Wilson, 2006) and Finland (Arranz-Aperte and Heshmati, 2003). 
These disparities do not appear in Italian enterprises,  
Conversely, workforce composition by gender plays a significant role, at variance with other country 
experiences: a higher percentage of female employees lowers the probability of both firm level bargaining 
and contingent pay. A cautionary explanation is necessary, since the percentage of women is very likely to 
be correlated with unobserved (or omitted) firm characteristics. In any case, in Italy, the negative correlation 
between the percentage of female workers and the spread of integrative bargaining schemes has some points 
in common with the traditional literature of economic discrimination against women in the labour market 
(Naticchioni and Ricci, 2009). This interpretation finds support from comparisons from other countries. A 
case in point is France, where firm-level agreements, set independently of union influence, benefit women 
particularly (Fakhfakh and FitzRoy, 2004). Analogous benefits are obtained by the female component in a 
country such as Germany, where collective bargaining plays a great role: in this economy, the wage premium 
obtained by works councils, around 11%, is also higher for women than for men (Addison et al. 2006). 
 
Firm characteristics 
As expected, firm size significantly influences the probability of decentralised agreements and PRP: firms 
with at least 250 employees have more than 50% probability to sign this kind of agreements with respect to 
the  smallest  ones  (those  with  less  than  15  employees)  and  nearly  30%  more  probability  to  adopt  PRP. 
Similar effects are obtained for industry and services and are  coherent with other studies that signal the 
crucial role that size, which explains, more than sectoral specialisation, major Italian differences and gaps 
with respect to their  major foreign  competitors (Pagano and Schivardi 2003; Brandolini and Bugamelli,  
2009).  
It  is  reasonable  that  as  firm  size  increases,  collective  local  negotiations  are  more  likely  needed  to 
coordinate complex organisational structures, which call for adopting rules tailored to large firm specific 
needs  and  not  set  by  sectoral  contracts.  Notice  also  that  national  contracts  set  the  tariff  wage,  in  Italy 
equivalent to the minimum wage, which varies by sector and qualification, but not by firm size; hence, the 
local bargaining offers the possibility of creating a wage drift for larger companies.  
It must be added that in related literature on PRP, the expected role of size is not clear cut since two 
opposite effects are conceivable. On one hand, asymmetric information and monitoring costs increase with 
firm  size  and  explain  the  positive  correlation.  On  the  other  hand,  for  collective  bonuses  opportunistic 
behaviour and free-riding arguments are more frequent in large firms, since horizontal mutual monitoring 
and peer pressure are more difficult, thus generating an opposite, negative correlation (Prendergast 1999). On 11 
 
empirical grounds, international evidence on collective incentive schemes (Pérotin and Robinson, 2003). In 
our economy, we obtain as found for US and Germany, that contingent pays are positively related to size 
(Jones and Pliskin 1997; Heywood, and Jirjahn 2002). 
 
Performance and innovation 
SLB and PRP are positively conditioned by productive performance, as formalized by the (log of) value 
added per employee. However, in PRP estimates, the smaller magnitude obtained for the related coefficient 
(also with respect to SLB estimates), signal that concession agreements, adopted in firms with higher ‘ability 
to pay,’ have had limited influence.  
One further result in order concerns innovation: Table 4 and 5 reveal that the dummy variable which 
captures  the  adoption  of  (product  and  process)  innovation  activities  play  a  significant  role,  of  small 
magnitude, only as determinant of SLB, but not on the PRP probability. It reveals that risky situations are not 
conducive to wage flexibility, as also confirmed by the non significant effects of volatilities of sales on PRP.  
It seems to mark an impasse in those trends towards implementation organisational flexibility, which 
emerged  in Italy from similar studies for previous years. These studies showed that firms  offering PRP 
invested more than others and implemented innovative plans which needed cooperative relationships to deal 
with those organizational changes (Biagioli and Curatolo, 1999) or were “on average good performers in the 
process of making changes to technology and work organisation” (Amisano and Del Boca, 2004, p.464). It 
does not seem true for the last years. 
 
Geographical location 
Our results also show that regional differentials in our sampled period are still significant, even after 
controlling for an ample set of covariates: decentralised agreements and PRP are more likely adopted in 
Northern regions;  in addition these same regions are not fully  homogenous as North-East shows  higher 
probability of both SLB and PRP with respect to North-West (the omitted area). The results also confirm a 
substantial stagnation and inertia in regional imbalances since similar differentials for probabilities of local 




We also control for the role of sectors. Table 4 reports estimates for SLB for the whole economy and 
shows that all industries, with respect to the omitted category (quarrying, distribution of gas, and others) 
have lower probabilities to sign local agreements (Table 4). Concerning PRP, as shown by Table 5, the 
differences are lower: the manufacturing sector, traditionally a leader in wage setting, is not characterized by 
a significant difference with respect to the omitted one. Additional findings for the role of firm sectoral 
specialization are shown below. 
 
5. Disaggregated analysis: industry and service sectors 
We replicate the econometric analysis by separating industry and services. The results of pooled and 
random effect probit estimates of equation (1’) are displayed in Table 6 and 7 for industry and in Table 8 and 
9 for services.   
For industry, all estimates confirm previous main results: the presence of unions and the intensity of 
training investment, considered separately, are positively associated with the probability of adoption of SLB 12 
 
and PRP. In particular, the marginal effects obtained with pooled and random probit estimates for union is 
higher than 0.30 for SLB and about 0.20 for PRP, (see columns a and c of Table 6 and 7). Conversely, the 
interaction term union*trained workers is no more statistically significant (with the only exception of pooled 
probit estimates for PRP).  
Concerning other firm and workforce characteristics, pooled and random probit estimates suggest that 
productivity  and  firms  size  favour  the  adoption  of  SLB  and  PRP,  while  the  share  of  females  and 
geographical  location  in  Southern  region  discourage  SLB.  Interestingly,  innovation  does  no  exert  a 
significant positive role in enhancing SLB and PRP, while the negative marginal effects on PRP associated 
to the share of fixed terms workers is statistically significant with pooled probit estimates. 
For services, Tables 7 and 8 show that the marginal effects of union on SLB and PRP estimates are 
similar  in  magnitude  to  those  found  for  the  industrial  sector,  in  all  specifications.  Conversely,  training 
intensity has lower association with SLB, at least when the interaction terms are not included (see columns a 
and c of Table 8 and 9). However, the introduction of  the interaction term offers a different picture: the 
share of trained workers exerts a positive impact on SLB only in unionized firms, conversely, training and its 
joint effect with unions are not statistically significant on PRP (see columns b and d of Table 8 and 9).  In 
other  terms,  training  intensity  exerts  a  positive  role  in  enhancing  SLB  mainly  when  it  is  organized  in 
unionised firms, while the presence of unions does not significantly increase the impact of training on PRP.   
In services, in comparison with industry, we obtain a more significant role of innovation on SLB, and of 
productive performances on PRP. Furthermore,  the female component, whose presence significantly reduces 
the probability of SLB and PRP in manufacturing, is not significant in estimates for the services sector. 
Lastly, the professional structure of the workforce remains not statistically significant for both sectors. 
 
[INSERT Table 6] 
[INSERT Table 7] 
[INSERT Table 8] 




Weakness of decentralisation of bargaining and incentive devices in Italy is confirmed from descriptive 
statistics obtained from our database, which is the first to provide information on a nationally representative 
sample of manufacturing and services companies, of all sizes.  
Evidence on basic characteristics of Italian firms show that the group adopting decentralised bargaining 
and  PRP  is  quite  different  from  others.  In  this  group,  consisting  of  larger  and  best  performing  firms, 
collective action- through the presence of unions- is much higher and more intense their training activities. 
Our panel estimates allow making further steps to ascertain main factors behind decentralised bargaining 
and contingent pays and suggest some major conclusions. 
First,  we  find  evidence  that  firm  level  agreements  and  PRP  are  positively  related  to  unions,  whose 
presence, after company size, is the major determinant of adoption of the second level of bargaining and 
contingent pay, thus suggesting that PRP are not introduced on a unilateral basis, but through the organised 
action promoted by workers’ representatives. 
Second, the contribution of this paper is to ascertain for the first time, at least for the Italian economy, the 
role of strategies oriented to training. In some related studies for other economies, but focussed on explaining 13 
 
training intensity rather than bargaining intensity, it has been confirmed the positive influence of works 
councils in Germany or of profit sharing in the UK (see respectively, Kriechel et al. 2011, Gielen, 2011, 
Green and Heywood, 2011), and in any case no estimates are available for the Italian economy. All our 
findings  show the positive association of training with the probability of decentralised negotiations and 
PRP. In addition, a joint positive effect of training and unions, found in PRP estimates, suggests that the 
protective role of workers’ representation becomes more relevant in conditions of human capital investments 
due to job-related training.  
Third, as expected, we find that greater firm size, location in North-Eastern regions, smaller share of 
female workers are all factors associated with a higher propensity to resort to firm level agreements and 
contingent pay. These results, which give a picture of the Italian bargaining system not radically changed 
much over the past years, must be integrated with the role played by the sectoral dimension, i.e. by low 
probabilities  of  adoption  of  local  bargaining  and  PRP  in  services,  and  in  descending  order  in  industry. 
Indeed, in  contrast with experiences of other countries, as those examined by Addison et al. (2009), we 
obtain lower probabilities of signing firm level agreements in the tertiary sector; it is a remarkable result 
since  services  is  the  key  industry  where  productivity  increases,  obtained  through  good  human  resource 
practices, should be more necessary; this is particularly true for Italian private services, the only country-
sectoral case, which over the period 1995-2008 was characterized by a negative productivity growth in EU13 
(Damiani, Pompei and Ricci, 2011) 
Both employees and firms may lack proper incentives to invest in training for various reasons: fear of 
separation, imperfect observability in training activities, conflictual relations in sharing benefits from these 
investments. As shown for other countries, various institutional devices, “are designed to make workers more 
willing to invest in firm- and industry-specific skills that increase their dependence on particular employers 
and their vulnerability to market fluctuations” (Estevez et al., 2001). In our model economy one potential 
device  could  be  represented  by  the  ‘voice’  option  exerted  by  unions,  thorough  company  agreements. 
However, in Italy, the potential role of ‘negotiated’  responses, to counter the  effects of limited training 
activities, and contrast poor productivity performances, is only limited exploited and it is the main message 
of the present paper.  14 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the whole sample 
 
2005  2007  2005-2007 
 
mean   st. dev.  mean  st. dev.  mean  st.dev. 
             
Second level bargaining  0.17  0.38  0.14  0.35  0.16  0.36 
PRP  0.11  0.31  0.10  0.30  0.10  0.30 
% trained  0.19  0.31  0.20  0.32  0.20  0.31 
Union (0/1)  0.24  0.43  0.22  0.42  0.23  0.42 
Innovation (0/1)  0.57  0.50  0.63  0.48  0.60  0.49 
% female  0.34  0.25  0.29  0.25  0.32  0.25 
% managers  0.07  0.10  0.04  0.07  0.05  0.09 
% white collar  0.44  0.31  0.35  0.28  0.40  0.30 
% blue collars  0.49  0.31  0.62  0.30  0.55  0.31 
% fixed term contracts  0.10  0.13  0.09  0.16  0.09  0.15 
ln(value added)  10.55  0.75  10.79  0.54  10.67  0.66 
sd_dev_sales  0.17  0.11  0.19  0.11  0.18  0.11 
Seniority  21.47  15.06  23.54  15.65  22.51  15.39 
Firm size 
            15< employees  0.39  0.49  0.38  0.49  0.39  0.49 
14 <employees<50  0.46  0.50  0.47  0.50  0.46  0.50 
49<employees<250  0.13  0.33  0.12  0.32  0.12  0.33 
 > 249employees  0.03  0.16  0.03  0.16  0.03  0.16 
Macro-region 
            North West   0.35  0.48  0.34  0.48  0.35  0.48 
North East  0.26  0.44  0.28  0.45  0.27  0.45 
Centre   0.20  0.40  0.21  0.40  0.20  0.40 
South  0.19  0.39  0.17  0.38  0.18  0.38 
Sector 
            Quarrying; gas, water and gas 
distribution; others  0.02  0.13  0.01  0.12  0.02  0.12 
Textile  0.14  0.35  0.13  0.34  0.13  0.34 
Manufacturing  0.17  0.38  0.18  0.39  0.18  0.38 
Mechanics   0.15  0.36  0.15  0.36  0.15  0.36 
Construction  0.14  0.35  0.15  0.35  0.15  0.35 
Trade, hotels and rest.  0.16  0.37  0.18  0.39  0.17  0.38 
Transport and com.  0.04  0.19  0.05  0.22  0.04  0.21 
intermediation and Business 
services  0.07  0.26  0.09  0.29  0.08  0.27 
Education, health and public 
services  0.11  0.31  0.05  0.21  0.08  0.27 
              N. of Observations  3320  3455  6775 
                    






Table  2:  Descriptive  statistics  of  the  firms  without  and  with  firm  level 
contracts, and with or without PRP, 2005 
   without SLB   with SLB  
 
      PRP  No PRP  
 
mean  st. dev  mean  st. dev  mean  st. dev 
              % trained  0.17  0.30  0.29  0.34  0.27  0.33 
Union (0/1)  0.13  0.33  0.87  0.33  0.68  0.47 
Innovation (0/1)  0.55  0.50  0.70  0.46  0.65  0.48 
% female  0.35  0.25  0.26  0.21  0.34  0.30 
% managers  0.07  0.10  0.06  0.09  0.08  0.11 
% white collars  0.44  0.31  0.46  0.28  0.42  0.30 
% blue collars  0.49  0.32  0.48  0.29  0.50  0.29 
% fixed term contracts  0.10  0.14  0.08  0.10  0.08  0.10 
ln(value added)  10.51  0.73  10.88  0.65  10.54  0.97 
sd_dev_sales  0.17  0.11  0.15  0.11  0.18  0.12 
Seniority  20.09  13.83  29.86  19.13  25.23  17.23 
Firm size             
15< employees  0.45  0.50  0.06  0.24  0.21  0.41 
14 <employees<50  0.47  0.50  0.40  0.49  0.37  0.48 
49<employees<250  0.07  0.26  0.40  0.49  0.34  0.47 
 > 249 employees  0.01  0.09  0.13  0.34  0.07  0.26 
Macro-region             
North West   0.35  0.48  0.35  0.48  0.41  0.49 
North East  0.24  0.43  0.42  0.49  0.32  0.47 
Centre   0.20  0.40  0.15  0.35  0.15  0.36 
South  0.21  0.41  0.09  0.28  0.12  0.33 
Sector             
Quarrying; gas, water and gas 
distribution; others 
0.01  0.11  0.05  0.21  0.03  0.16 
Textile  0.14  0.34  0.15  0.35  0.16  0.37 
Manufacturing  0.16  0.37  0.27  0.44  0.14  0.35 
Mechanics  0.14  0.35  0.27  0.44  0.14  0.35 
Construction  0.16  0.37  0.02  0.14  0.09  0.29 
trade, hotels and rest.  0.17  0.38  0.11  0.31  0.16  0.37 
transport and comm..  0.04  0.20  0.02  0.15  0.02  0.14 
Intermediation and Business 
services 
0.07  0.25  0.08  0.27  0.07  0.25 
Education, health and public 
services 
0.11  0.31  0.05  0.22  0.19  0.39 
              N. of observations  2368  665  287 
                    






Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the firms without and with firm level 
contracts, and with or without PRP,2007 
   without FLC  with FLC 
     
PRP   no PRP 
 
mean  st. dev.  mean  st. dev  mean  st. dev. 
              % trained  0.20  0.32  0.24  0.32  0.23  0.34 
Union (0/1)  0.14  0.35  0.87  0.33  0.40  0.49 
Innovation (0/1)  0.62  0.49  0.73  0.45  0.64  0.48 
% female  0.29  0.25  0.24  0.20  0.32  0.25 
% managers  0.03  0.07  0.06  0.08  0.05  0.09 
% white collars  0.35  0.29  0.32  0.22  0.34  0.27 
% blue collars  0.62  0.31  0.62  0.25  0.61  0.30 
% fixed term contracts  0.10  0.16  0.06  0.09  0.13  0.20 
ln(value added)  10.76  0.54  11.03  0.49  10.82  0.49 
sd_dev_sales  0.19  0.11  0.15  0.09  0.20  0.15 
Seniority  22.11  14.04  34.96  21.45  27.58  19.97 
Firm size             
15< employees  0.43  0.49  0.03  0.18  0.28  0.45 
14<employees<50  0.48  0.50  0.37  0.48  0.48  0.50 
49<employees<250  0.08  0.28  0.44  0.50  0.17  0.38 
 > 249 employees  0.01  0.10  0.16  0.36  0.08  0.27 
Macro-region             
North West  0.34  0.47  0.43  0.50  0.34  0.47 
North East  0.28  0.45  0.34  0.47  0.24  0.43 
Centre   0.20  0.40  0.18  0.38  0.29  0.46 
South  0.18  0.39  0.06  0.23  0.14  0.34 
Sector             
Quarrying; gas, water and 
gas distr., others 
0.01  0.10  0.04  0.19  0.02  0.14 
Textile  0.12  0.33  0.18  0.38  0.19  0.39 
Manufacturing  0.18  0.38  0.28  0.45  0.11  0.31 
Mechanics  0.14  0.35  0.27  0.44  0.14  0.35 
Construction  0.16  0.37  0.02  0.14  0.13  0.34 
Trade, hotels and rest.  0.20  0.40  0.07  0.26  0.18  0.39 
Transport and comm..  0.05  0.22  0.08  0.27  0.08  0.26 
Intermediation and 
business services 
0.09  0.29  0.04  0.21  0.12  0.33 
Education, health and 
public services 
0.05  0.22  0.02  0.13  0.03  0.16 
             
N. of observations  2680  560  215 
                    







Table 4: Probability of adoption SLB, 2005-2007. Marginal effects  
 
POOLED PROBIT  RE PROBIT 
 
dy/dx     st er  dy/dx     st er  dy/dx     st er  dy/dx     st er 
 
(a)        (b)        (c)        (d)       
                         
% trained  0.102  ***  0.016  0.058  **  0.027  0.090  ***  0.016  0.053  **  0.023 
Union (1/0)  0.353  ***  0.014  0.333  ***  0.017  0.364  ***  0.018  0.342  ***  0.020 
% trained*union  0.078  **  0.035    0.067  **  0.031 
Innovation (1/0)  0.035  **  0.012  0.036  **  0.012  0.031  **  0.010  0.032  **  0.010 
% female  -0.166  ***  0.027  -0.165  ***  0.027  -0.156  ***  0.026  -0.156  ***  0.026 
% white collars  -0.058  0.075  -0.056  0.076  -0.077  0.060  -0.077  0.061 
% blue collars  -0.042  0.073  -0.041  0.074  -0.065  0.059  -0.064  0.059 
% fixed term contracts  -0.027  0.045  -0.027  0.045  -0.038  0.039  -0.038  0.039 
ln(value added)  0.030  ***  0.009  0.030  ***  0.009  0.025  **  0.009  0.025  **  0.009 
st. dev. sales  0.115  *  0.063  0.117  *  0.063  0.099  *  0.057  0.101  *  0.057 
Seniority  0.002  ***  0.000  0.002  ***  0.000  0.002  ***  0.000  0.002  ***  0.000 
14<employees<50  0.057  **  0.020  0.058  **  0.020  0.053  **  0.018  0.054  **  0.018 
49<employees<250  0.220  ***  0.026  0.221  ***  0.026  0.249  ***  0.031  0.251  ***  0.031 
 > 249 employees  0.416  ***  0.037  0.416  ***  0.037  0.525  ***  0.050  0.525  ***  0.050 
North East  0.034  **  0.015  0.034  **  0.015  0.033  **  0.015  0.034  **  0.015 
Centre  -0.024  0.016  -0.024  0.016  -0.021  0.014  -0.021  0.014 
South  -0.097  ***  0.015  -0.096  ***  0.015  -0.078  ***  0.012  -0.078  ***  0.012 
Textile et al.  -0.057  **  0.028  -0.058  **  0.028  -0.052  **  0.022  -0.052  **  0.022 
Chemistry et others.  -0.057  **  0.027  -0.058  **  0.027  -0.050  **  0.021  -0.051  **  0.021 
Manufacturing  -0.055  **  0.027  -0.057  **  0.027  -0.052  **  0.022  -0.053  **  0.022 
Construction  -0.100  ***  0.024  -0.101  ***  0.024  -0.082  ***  0.016  -0.082  ***  0.016 
Trade, hotels and rest.  -0.082  ***  0.025  -0.083  ***  0.025  -0.068  ***  0.018  -0.068  ***  0.019 
 Transport and comm.  -0.016  0.035  -0.017  0.035  -0.020  0.029  -0.020  0.029 
 Intermediation and 
business services  -0.078  **  0.025  -0.079  ***  0.025  -0.069  *** 
0.017 
-0.070  ***  0.017 
Education, health and 
public services  -0.126  ***  0.020  -0.128  ***  0.020  -0.094  *** 
0.014 
-0.095  ***  0.014 
Year 2007  -0.092  ***  0.010  -0.092  ***  0.010  -0.085  ***  0.010  -0.086  ***  0.010 
 
 
sigma_u  0.977  0.070  0.975  0.070 
Rho  0.488  0.036  0.487  0.036 
  Wald chi2  1628.28  1652.03  671.21  672.51 
Prob > chi2  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Pseudo R2  0.36 
 0.3650 
 
N. of observations  6848  6848 
N. of groups  4085 
                                      
Note: Omitted variables: North West, quarrying, % managers, year 2005, firm with less than 15 employees; standard error 




Table 5: Probability of adoption PRP, 2005-2007. Marginal effects  
 
POOLED PROBIT  RE PROBIT 
 
dy/dx     st er  dy/dx     st er  dy/dx     st er  dy/dx     st er 
 
(a)        (b)        ( c)        (d)       
                          % trained  0.056  ***  0.010  0.017  0.020  0.030  ***  0.007  0.011  0.012 
union (1/0)  0.253  ***  0.013  0.235  ***  0.015  0.198  ***  0.017  0.182  ***  0.018 
%trained*union  0.055  **  0.024  0.027  *  0.014 
innovation (1/0)  0.011  0.007  0.012  0.007  0.007  *  0.004  0.007  *  0.004 
% female  -0.092  ***  0.017  -0.092  ***  0.017  -0.052  ***  0.012  -0.053  ***  0.012 
% white collars  0.008  0.048  0.008  0.049  -0.005  0.024  -0.005  0.024 
% blue collars  -0.002  0.046  -0.003  0.047  -0.013  0.023  -0.013  0.024 
% ftshare  0.006  0.030  0.007  0.030  0.005  0.016  0.006  0.016 
ln(value_added)  0.024  ***  0.006  0.024  ***  0.006  0.012  ***  0.004  0.012  ***  0.004 
sd_dev_sales  0.063  0.043  0.066  0.043  0.027  0.022  0.029  0.023 
seniority  0.001  ***  0.000  0.001  ***  0.000  0.000  ***  0.000  0.000  ***  0.000 
14<employees<50  0.034  **  0.016  0.035  **  0.016  0.018  **  0.009  0.019  **  0.009 
49<employees<250  0.147  ***  0.024  0.148  ***  0.024  0.108  ***  0.022  0.110  ***  0.022 
> 249 employees  0.312  ***  0.040  0.314  ***  0.040  0.308  ***  0.052  0.310  ***  0.052 
North East  0.040  ***  0.011  0.040  ***  0.011  0.023  ***  0.007  0.024  ***  0.007 
Centre  -0.022  **  0.009  -0.022  **  0.009  -0.012  **  0.005  -0.012  **  0.005 
South  -0.062  **  0.008  -0.062  ***  0.008  -0.029  ***  0.005  -0.029  ***  0.005 
Textile et al.  -0.036  **  0.017  -0.037  **  0.017  -0.018  **  0.007  -0.018  **  0.008 
Chemistry et al.  -0.024  0.018  -0.025  0.018  -0.012  0.008  -0.012  0.008 
Manufacturing  -0.025  0.018  -0.026  0.018  -0.013  0.008  -0.013  0.008 
Construction  -0.083  ***  0.009  -0.084  ***  0.009  -0.034  ***  0.006  -0.034  ***  0.006 
Trade, hotels and rest.  -0.054  ***  0.013  -0.055  ***  0.013  -0.025  ***  0.006  -0.025  ***  0.006 
Transport and comm.  -0.027  0.019  -0.027  0.019  -0.012  0.008  -0.012  0.008 
 Intermediation and 
business services  -0.052  ***  0.013  -0.052  ***  0.013  -0.024  ***  0.006  -0.024  ***  0.006 
Education, health and 
public services  -0.074  ***  0.010  -0.075  ***  0.010  -0.030  ***  0.006  -0.031  ***  0.006 
Year 2007   -0.025  ***  0.006  -0.025  ***  0.006  -0.013  ***  0.004  -0.013  ***  0.004 
  sigma_u  0.976  0.078  0.972  0.078 
Rho  0.488  0.040  0.486  0.040 
  Wald chi2  1278.04  1309.23  516.70  518.93 
Prob > chi2  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Pseudo R2  0.39 
N. of observations  6781  6781 
N. of groups  4077 
                                      
Note: Omitted variables: North West, quarrying, % managers, year 2005, firm with less than 15 employees; standard error 





Table 6: Probability of adoption SLB, 2005-2007. Industrial sector. Marginal effects 
 
POOLED PROBIT  RE PROBIT 
 
dy/dx     st er  dy/dx     st er  dy/dx     st er  dy/dx     st er 
 
(a)        (b)        (c )        (d)       
                          % trained  0.128  ***  0.024  0.098  **  0.037  0.124  ***  0.024  0.092  **  0.037 
 union (1/0)  0.363  ***  0.018  0.351  ***  0.021  0.383  ***  0.023  0.369  ***  0.026 
% trained*union  0.054  0.049  0.057  0.048 
innovation (1/0)  0.013  0.017  0.013  0.017  0.014  0.016  0.014  0.016 
% female  -0.211  ***  0.041  -0.211  ***  0.041  -0.214  ***  0.044  -0.214  ***  0.045 
% white collars  0.027  0.128  0.033  0.128  -0.012  0.113  -0.007  0.113 
% blue collars   0.063  0.124  0.068  0.125  0.020  0.110  0.026  0.110 
% fixed term 
contracts   -0.214  **  0.078  -0.212  **  0.078  -0.212  **  0.074  -0.211  **  0.074 
ln(value added)  0.052  ***  0.013  0.052  ***  0.013  0.051  ***  0.014  0.051  ***  0.014 
st.dev. sales  -0.093  0.102  -0.098  0.102  -0.102  0.111  -0.108  0.112 
seniority  0.002  ***  0.000  0.002  ***  0.000  0.002  ***  0.000  0.002  ***  0.000 
14< employees<50  0.093  ***  0.028  0.094  ***  0.028  0.092  ***  0.028  0.093  ***  0.028 
49<employees<250  0.286  ***  0.035  0.287  ***  0.035  0.351  ***  0.045  0.353  ***  0.045 
 > 249 employees  0.550  ***  0.043  0.550  ***  0.043  0.703  ***  0.054  0.703  ***  0.054 
North East  0.040  *  0.021  0.040  *  0.021  0.039  *  0.022  0.038  *  0.022 
Centre  -0.029  0.022  -0.029  0.022  -0.032  0.021  -0.032  0.021 
South  -0.083  ***  0.023  -0.083  ***  0.023  -0.076  ***  0.020  -0.075  ***  0.020 
Textile et others  -0.086  **  0.034  -0.087  **  0.034  -0.086  **  0.030  -0.087  **  0.030 
Manufacturing  -0.090  **  0.031  -0.091  **  0.031  -0.086  ***  0.026  -0.087  ***  0.026 
Chemistry et others  -0.080  **  0.033  -0.081  **  0.033  -0.083  **  0.030  -0.084  **  0.030 
Construction  -0.139  ***  0.030  -0.140  ***  0.030  -0.125  ***  0.022  -0.126  ***  0.022 
Year 2007  -0.105  ***  0.014  -0.105  ***  0.014  -0.106  ***  0.016  -0.106  ***  0.016 
  sigma_u  1.02  0.09  1.018  0.090 
rho  0.51  0.04  0.509  0.044 
  Wald chi2  1077.34  1084.56  420.89  422.03 
Prob > chi2  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Pseudo R2  0.39  0.39 
N. of groups  2494  2494 
N. of observations  4187  4187  4187  4187 
                          Note: Omitted variables: North West, quarrying, % managers, year 2005, firm with less than 15 employees; 












Table 7: Probability of adoption PRP, 2005-2007. Industrial sector. Marginal effects  
 
POOLED PROBIT  RE PROBIT 
 
dy/dx     st er  dy/dx     st er  dy/dx     st er  dy/dx     st er 
 
(a)        (b)        (c )        (d)       
                          % trained  0.061  ***  0.015  0.016  0.029  0.037  ***  0.011  0.010  0.020 
 union (1/0)  0.266  ***  0.016  0.250  ***  0.018  0.215  ***  0.022  0.199  ***  0.023 
% trained*union  0.062  *  0.035  0.039  0.024 
innovation (1/0)  0.004  0.012  0.004  0.012  0.005  0.007  0.004  0.007 
% female  -0.148  ***  0.029  -0.148  ***  0.029  -0.094  ***  0.022  -0.095  ***  0.022 
% white collars  0.038  0.082  0.043  0.083  0.010  0.049  0.013  0.050 
% blue collars   0.050  0.079  0.055  0.080  0.012  0.048  0.015  0.048 
% fixed term contracts   -0.105  *  0.054  -0.102  *  0.054  -0.053  0.034  -0.052  0.034 
ln(value added)  0.032  ***  0.009  0.032  ***  0.009  0.018  **  0.006  0.018  **  0.007 
st. dev. sales  0.071  0.076  0.068  0.077  0.042  0.047  0.040  0.047 
Seniority  0.001  **  0.000  0.001  **  0.000  0.001  **  0.000  0.001  **  0.000 
14 employees<50  0.055  **  0.023  0.056  **  0.023  0.032  **  0.015  0.033  **  0.015 
49<employees<250  0.205  ***  0.033  0.206  ***  0.033  0.176  ***  0.036  0.178  ***  0.036 
 > 249employees  0.420  ***  0.053  0.421  ***  0.053  0.467  ***  0.074  0.469  ***  0.074 
North East  0.050  ***  0.016  0.050  ***  0.016  0.033  **  0.012  0.033  **  0.012 
Centre  -0.033  **  0.013  -0.033  **  0.013  -0.020  **  0.008  -0.020  **  0.008 
South  -0.077  ***  0.013  -0.077  ***  0.013  -0.042  ***  0.008  -0.042  ***  0.009 
Textile et al.  -0.040  *  0.024  -0.042  *  0.025  -0.024  *  0.013  -0.025  *  0.013 
Chemistry et others   -0.029  0.024  -0.031  0.024  -0.017  0.013  -0.018  0.013 
Manufacturing  -0.030  0.024  -0.032  0.024  -0.019  0.013  -0.020  0.013 
Construction  -0.113  ***  0.015  -0.114  ***  0.015  -0.057  ***  0.011  -0.058  ***  0.011 
year 2007  -0.025  **  0.010  -0.025  **  0.010  -0.014  **  0.007  -0.014  **  0.007 
  sigma_u  0.996  0.096  0.996  0.096 
Rho  0.498  0.048  0.498  0.048 
  Wald chi2  808.87  823.13  348.24  348.460 
Prob > chi2  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Pseudo R2  0.403  0.404 
N. of groups  2487  2487 
N. of observations  4146  4146  4146  4146 
Note: Omitted variables: North West, quarrying, % managers, year 2005, firm with less than 15 employees; 
standard error adjusted for firm clusters; ***  significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%; regressions performed with 











Table 8: Probability of adoption SLB, 2005-2007. Service sector. Marginal effects  
 
POOLED PROBIT  RE PROBIT 
 
dy/dx     st er  dy/dx     st er  dy/dx     st er  dy/dx     st er 
 
(a)        (b)        (c )        (d)       
                          % trained  0.069  ***  0.021  0.004  0.035  0.056  **  0.019  0.009  0.028 
 Union (1/0)  0.349  ***  0.024  0.308  ***  0.029  0.351  ***  0.029  0.311  ***  0.033 
% trained*union  0.119  **  0.046  0.088  **  0.039 
Innovation (1/0)  0.046  **  0.015  0.049  ***  0.015  0.038  **  0.012  0.041  ***  0.013 
% female  -0.128  ***  0.031  -0.128  ***  0.031  -0.108  ***  0.028  -0.109  ***  0.028 
% white collars  -0.110  0.081  -0.113  0.082  -0.108  *  0.061  -0.111  *  0.062 
% blue collars  -0.111  0.079  -0.114  0.080  -0.107  *  0.059  -0.110  *  0.060 
% fixed term contracts   0.061  0.044  0.059  0.044  0.038  0.038  0.038  0.038 
ln(value added)  0.009  0.011  0.009  0.011  0.004  0.010  0.005  0.010 
st. dev. Sales  0.144  **  0.067  0.156  0.067  0.113  **  0.055  0.123  **  0.056 
Seniority  0.001  **  0.000  0.001  **  0.000  0.001  **  0.000  0.001  **  0.000 
14<employees<50  -0.002  0.025  -0.002  0.025  0.001  0.021  0.001  0.021 
49<employees<250  0.110  **  0.035  0.110  **  0.035  0.108  **  0.035  0.109  **  0.035 
>249 employees  0.200  ***  0.051  0.199  ***  0.051  0.221  ***  0.062  0.220  ***  0.061 
North East  0.011  0.020  0.012  0.020  0.013  0.018  0.014  0.018 
Centre  -0.016  0.020  -0.018  0.020  -0.011  0.017  -0.012  0.018 
South  -0.093  ***  0.018  -0.092  ***  0.018  -0.068  ***  0.014  -0.069  ***  0.014 
Trade, hotels and rest.  -0.066  ***  0.021  -0.066  ***  0.020  -0.051  **  0.017  -0.051  **  0.017 
Transport and comm..  -0.068  ***  0.020  -0.070  ***  0.020  -0.053  ***  0.015  -0.055  ***  0.015 
Education, health and 
public services  -0.115  ***  0.020  -0.117  ***  0.020  -0.084  ***  0.017  -0.086  ***  0.017 
Year 2007  -0.081  ***  0.014  -0.083  ***  0.014  -0.068  ***  0.013  -0.070  ***  0.013 
  sigma_u  0.84  0.11  0.831  0.112 
rho  0.42  0.06  0.408  0.065 
  Wald chi2  541.63  566.72  247.2  248.6 
Prob > chi2  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Pseudo R2  0.33  0.33 
N. of groups  1621  1621 
N. of observations  2661  2661  2661  2661 
                         
Note: Omitted variables: North West, intermediation and business services, % managers, year 2005, firm with less than 15 
employees; standard error adjusted for firm clusters; ***  significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%; regressions performed 











Table 9: Probability of adoption PRP, 2005-2007. Service sector. Marginal effetcs 
 
POOLED PROBIT  RE PROBIT 
 
dy/dx     st er  dy/dx     st er  dy/dx     st er  dy/dx     st er 
 
(a)        (b)        ( c)        (d)       
                          % trained  0.047  ***  0.012  0.017    0.024  0.020  **  0.008  0.010    0.011 
Union (1/0)  0.244  ***  0.022  0.220  ***  0.026  0.184  ***  0.029  0.165  ***  0.031 
% trained*union      0.044    0.029        0.016    0.014 
Innovation (1/0)  0.015  *  0.008  0.016  *  0.008  0.006    0.004  0.007    0.004 
% female  -0.042  **  0.018  -0.043  **  0.018  -0.019  *  0.010  -0.019  **  0.010 
% white collar  -0.014  0.046  -0.016    0.047  -0.010    0.018  -0.011    0.019 
% blue collars  -0.038  0.045  -0.040    0.046  -0.021    0.018  -0.023    0.019 
% fixed term contracts   0.053  **  0.026  0.053  **  0.026  0.023    0.013  0.024  *  0.014 
ln(value. added)  0.015  **  0.007  0.015  **  0.007  0.006  *  0.003  0.006  *  0.003 
st. dev. Sales  0.036  0.040  0.041    0.041  0.009    0.017  0.011    0.018 
Seniority  0.000  *  0.000  0.000  *  0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000    0.000 
14<employees<50  0.004  0.019  0.005    0.019  0.003    0.008  0.003    0.008 
49<employees<250  0.065  **  0.028  0.067  **  0.028  0.035  *  0.019  0.037  *  0.020 
 > 249 employees  0.147  **  0.047  0.149  ***  0.047  0.107  **  0.048  0.110  **  0.049 
North East  0.023  *  0.013  0.023  *  0.013  0.011    0.007  0.012    0.007 
Centre  -0.005  0.012  -0.006    0.012  -0.003    0.005  -0.003    0.005 
South  -0.038  ***  0.010  -0.038  ***  0.010  -0.014  **  0.006  -0.014  **  0.006 
Trade, hotels and rest.  -0.003  0.013  -0.003    0.013  -0.001    0.005  -0.001    0.005 
Transport and com.  0.041  **  0.020  0.042  **  0.021  0.025  *  0.013  0.026  *  0.014 
Education, health and 
public services 
-0.032  **  0.011  -0.033  **  0.011  -0.010  *  0.005  -0.010  *  0.006 
Year 2007  -0.032  ***  0.008  -0.033  ***  0.008  -0.014  **  0.006  -0.015  **  0.006 
  sigma_u  0.942  0.143  0.931  0.143 
rho  0.470  0.076  0.464  0.076 
  Wald chi2  496.74  515.92  151.640  154.010 
Prob > chi2  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Pseudo R2  0.36  0.37 
N. of groups  1620  1620 
N. of observations  2635  2635  2635  2635 
Note: Omitted variables: North West, quarrying, % managers, year 2005, firm with less than 15 employees; standard 














Table A1: variable definition 
Productivity  Log of the valued added (source AIDA) and deflated by the value added 
deflator (source, ISTAT).  
Training  Proportion of trained on total employment  
Firm Size    Total number of employees divided in four classes by size 
SLB  Dummy  variable  that  equals  to  1  if  the  firm  adopts  second  level 
bargaining, 0 otherwise 
PRP   Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm adopts PRP payments of any 
kind, 0 otherwise. 
Unions   Dummy  variable  that  equals  1  if  in  the  firm  there  is  a  worker 
representation on any kind, 0 otherwise  
% Female  Proportion of females on total employment 
% Managers   Proportion of managers and supervisors on total employment  
% White-collars   Proportion of white collars on total employment 
% Blue-collars  Proportion of manual workers on total employment 
% Fixed-term  Proportion of fixed-term workers on total employment  
 St.dev. sales  Average value of standard deviation of sales over the period 2002-2005, 
calculated by cells (organized for each 2-digit industry and firm size ) the 
firm belongs to 
North-West   Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is localized in North-Western 
regions, 0 otherwise. 
 
North-East 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is localized in North-Eastern 
regions, 0 otherwise. 
Centre   Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is localized in Central regions, 0 
otherwise. 
South  Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is localized in Southern regions, 
0 otherwise. 
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